7.1 Bare Act Provisions
6. Terms and conditions of service of members.—
1[(1) A person appointed as Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other member after the commencement of the University Grants Commission (Amendment) Act, 1985 shall, unless he sooner becomes disqualified for continuing as such under the rules that may be made under this Act,—
(a) in the case of Chairman, hold office for a term of five years or until he attains the age of sixty-five years, whichever is earlier;
(b) in the case of Vice-Chairman, hold office for a term of three years or until he attains the age of sixty-five years, whichever is earlier;
(c) in the case of any other member, hold office for a term of three years:
Provided that—
(i) a person who has held office as Chairman or Vice-Chairman shall be eligible for further appointment as Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other member, and
(ii) a person who has held office as any other member shall be eligible for further appointment as Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other member:
Provided further that a person who has held office for two terms, in any capacity, whether as Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other member [excluding a member referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 5], shall not be eligible for any further appointment as Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other member.]
(2) A member may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Central Government, but he shall continue in office until his resignation is accepted by the Central Government.
2[(3) If a casual vacancy occurs in the office of the Chairman, whether by reason of his death, resignation or inability to discharge his functions owing to illness or other incapacity, the Vice-Chairman holding office as such for the time being shall, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of section 5, act as the Chairman and shall, unless any other person is appointed earlier as the Chairman, hold the office of the Chairman for the remainder of the term of office of the person in whose place he is to so act:
Provided that where no Vice-Chairman is holding office at the time when the vacancy in the office of the Chairman occurs, the Central Government shall, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of section 5, appoint any other member to act as the Chairman and the person so appointed shall not hold the office of the Chairman for a period exceeding six months.
(4) If a casual vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice-Chairman or any other member, whether by reason of his death, resignation or inability to discharge his functions owing to illness or other incapacity, such vacancy shall be filled up by the Central Government by making a fresh appointment and the member so appointed shall hold office for a term of three years.
(5) The office of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman shall be whole-time and salaried and subject thereto, the terms and conditions of service of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other members shall be such as may be prescribed.]
Footnote from Bare Act:
1. Subs. by Act 70 of 1985, s. 2, for sub-section (1) (w.e.f. 20-12-1985).
2. Subs. by Act 33 of 1972, s. 4, for sub-sections (3) and (4) (w.e.f. 17-6-1972).
7.2 Explanation
The Act sets out rules for how long someone can stay in their position and what happens if they resign. Because of the definition in 2(d), the term limits and removal processes described in Section 6 apply to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman just as they do to any other appointee, unless a specific distinction is made. The Act says members shall serve for a certain period and receive such salary as may be “prescribed.” Because of Section 2(e), we know this means the Government must pass a specific set of Rules to decide the exact salary and benefits, rather than having to change the whole Act every time there is a cost-of-living adjustment.
Sub-section (1) establishes a fixed-tenure system for the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, setting the Chairman’s term at five years and the Vice-Chairman’s at three years, both subject to a mandatory retirement age of 65. A statutory tenure is not at the pleasure of the government. Providing a fixed term is essential for the independence of statutory heads; if the government could terminate them at will, the Commission’s autonomy would be compromised. This provision is closely connected to Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as any arbitrary removal before the completion of the term mentioned in Section 6(1) would violate the right to equality and non-arbitrariness in state action.[1]
The Second proviso to Section 6(1) introduce a strict two-term eligibility limit, ensuring that no individual serves more than two terms in any capacity. The legal logic here is to prevent the creation of a permanent bureaucracy within an academic regulatory body, encouraging a healthy rotation of leadership and fresh educational policies. This aligns with the principles of democratic governance found in various specialized statutes, which similarly limit the duration of leadership to ensure institutional vitality. This limitation acts as a statutory check against the concentration of power, ensuring that the UGC remains a dynamic body capable of evolving with the changing landscape of global education.
Sub-section (2) deals with the process of resignation, stating that a member remains in office until the Central Government formally accepts their resignation. The judicial reasoning for this delayed exit is rooted in the principle of administrative continuity. In high-level statutory positions, a person cannot simply walk away and leave a vacuum in governance.[2] This provision connects to the law of contracts and service jurisprudence, where relieving an officer is a formal act required to transfer responsibilities and maintain the chain of command, ensuring that the UGC’s financial and administrative functions are not paralyzed by a sudden vacancy.
Sub-sections (3) and (4) manage casual vacancies caused by death or illness. Sub-section (3) mandates that the Vice-Chairman automatically acts as Chairman, while Sub-section (4) ensures that any new member appointed to a vacancy receives a fresh three-year term. For a professional to leave their existing career to join a statutory body, they must be guaranteed a meaningful period to contribute.[3] This sub-section interacts with the General Clauses Act, 1897, specifically regarding the power to appoint including the power to fill vacancies, ensuring that the Commission remains a continuing body even when individual members change.
Finally, Sub-section (5) declares the Chairman and Vice-Chairman as whole-time and salaried officers. This requirement is legally significant as it triggers the Office of Profit disqualifications under Article 102(1)(a) and Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. Because these are salaried positions under the control of the Central Government, the holders are generally barred from being members of Parliament or State Legislatures. The reasoning is to ensure total professional dedication to the UGC, preventing any conflict of interest between their regulatory duties and other commercial or political ventures. This ensures that the Commission’s leadership remains focused solely on the standards and coordination of higher education in India.
7.3 Critical Analysis
Section 6 of the UGC Act outlines the tenure, resignation, and vacancy protocols for the Commission. Below is the critical analysis based on administrative and constitutional principles.
Procedural Delay: The primary source of delay is found in Section 6(2) regarding the acceptance of resignations. A member who resigns must continue in office until the Central Government formally accepts the resignation. There is no deemed acceptance or statutory timeframe for the government to act. This can lead to a lame duck period where a member is legally bound to perform duties despite having expressed an intent to leave, often stalling decision-making or preventing the timely filling of a vacancy. In the absence of a specific provision, a resignation becomes effective only when accepted. Delays in such administrative actions can hinder the effective functioning of statutory bodies.[4]
Constitutional Validity and Ultra Vires: The differential treatment of terms for the Chairman for 5 years versus the Vice-Chairman and members for 3 years under Section 6(1) is generally valid, but the re-appointment clause in the proviso can face constitutional scrutiny under Article 14. While Parliament has wide latitude, if the Central Government selectively re-appoints certain members while denying others without rational criteria, it could be challenged as arbitrary. Furthermore, the exclusion of government officers appointed under Section 5(3)(a) from the two-term limit creates a privileged class of members who can serve indefinitely, potentially violating the principle of equality before the law. Arbitrariness is the antithesis of Article 14.[5] Thus any exercise of power under Section 6 regarding appointments must be based on objective standards to avoid being struck down as ultra vires.
Colonial Era Policy and Relevance: The Casual Vacancy management in Section 6(3) and 6(4) reflects a centralized, executive-heavy approach. The provision that a Vice-Chairman acts as Chairman “notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of section 5”, which says the Chairman should not be a government officer, allows for a backdoor entry of government influence. This temporary fix model is a relic of colonial administration where the executive preferred keeping control rather than having a robust, independent succession plan. In modern governance, an independent regulator should have an autonomous board-led succession rather than total reliance on Central Government notification. Although the NEP argues for a complete overhaul of these appointment structures to ensure academic and administrative autonomy, moving away from the 1950s model of executive-controlled tenures. But no such enactment has been passed by the Parliament of India.
Room for Misinterpretation: Section 6(3) contains significant room for misinterpretation regarding the phrase “inability to discharge his functions. The Act does not define inability or incapacity. This ambiguity allows the Central Government to potentially remove a Chairman or Vice-Chairman by declaring them unable to function without a formal inquiry or clear medical/legal standards. Additionally, the phrase “terms and conditions… as may be prescribed” in Section 6(5) leaves salary and perks to delegated legislation i.e. rules and regulations, which can be changed at the government’s whim, potentially undermining the independence of the office. The executive cannot use “terms and conditions of service” to infringe upon the independence of statutory heads.
[1] P. Venugopal v. Union of India [(2008) 5 SCC 1]
[2] Union of India v. Sayed Muzaffar Mir [(1995) Supp (1) SCC 76]
[3] Dr. L.P. Agarwal v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 526]
[4] Moti Ram v. Param Dev [(1993) 2 SCC 725]
[5] E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1974) 4 SCC 3]
